Abstract This article is concerned with the Axelrod model, a stochastic process which similarly to the voter model includes social influence, but unlike the voter model also accounts for homophily. Each vertex of the network of interactions is characterized by a set of cultural features, each of which can assume a fixed number of states. Pairs of adjacent vertices interact at a rate proportional to the number of features they share, which results in the interacting pair having one more cultural feature in common. The Axelrod model has been extensively studied the past ten years based on numerical simulations and simple mean-field treatments while there is a total lack of analytical results for the spatial model. Numerical results emerging from spatial simulations of the one-dimensional system are difficult to interpret but suggest that (i) when the number of cultural features and the number of states per feature both equal two or (ii) when the number of features exceeds the number of states per feature, the system converges to a monocultural equilibrium in the sense that a single culture ultimately occupies a macroscopically large fraction of the graph while (iii) when the number of states per feature exceeds the number of features, the system freezes in a highly fragmented configuration. In this article, we prove analytically conjecture (i) in terms of a clustering of the infinite system, and part of conjecture (iii). Our first result also applies to the constrained voter model.
Introduction
Opinion and cultural dynamics are driven by social influence, the tendency of individuals to become more similar when they interact, which is the basic mechanism of the voter model introduced independently by Clifford and Sudbury [4] and Holley and Liggett [7] . Social influence alone usually drives the system to a monocultural equilibrium, whereas differences between individuals and groups persist in the real world. In his seminal paper [1] , political scientist Robert Axelrod explains the diversity of cultures as a consequence of homophily, which is the tendency to interact more frequently with individuals which are more similar. In the Axelrod model, actors are characterized by a finite number of cultural features. In Axelrod's own words, the more similar an actor is to a neighbor, the more likely that actor will adopt one of the neighbor's traits [1] . The network is a finite connected graph G with vertex set V and edge set E. Each vertex x is characterized by a vector X(x) of F cultural features, each of which assuming q possible states:
X(x) = (X 1 (x), . . . , X F (x)) where X i (x) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} for i = 1, 2, . . . , F.
At each time-step, a vertex x is picked uniformly at random from the vertex set along with one of its neighbors y. Then, with a probability equal to the fraction of features x and y have in common, one of the features for which states are different (if any) is selected, and the state of vertex x is set equal to the state of vertex y for this cultural feature. Otherwise nothing happens. In order to describe more generally the Axelrod dynamics on both finite and infinite graphs, we assume that the system evolves in continuous-time with each pair of adjacent vertices interacting at rate one, which causes one of the two vertices chosen uniformly at random to mimic the other vertex in the case of an update. This induces a continuous-time Markov process whose state at time t is a function X t that maps the vertex set of the graph into the set of cultures {1, 2, . . . , q} F , and whose dynamics are described by the generator Ω ax defined on the set of cylinder functions by Ω ax f (X) = x∈V x∼y
where x ∼ y means that x and y are connected by an edge,
y→x (x) = (X 1 (x), . . . , X i−1 (x), X i (y), X i+1 (x), . . . , X F (x)) and X i y→x (z) = X(z) for all z = x, and
is the fraction of cultural features vertices x and y have in common. The two-feature two-state Axelrod model is also closely related to the constrained voter model of Vázquez et al [8] which identifies two of the cultures with no common feature to be a centrist opinion, and the two other cultures to be a leftist and a rightist opinions, respectively. This results in a stochastic process somewhat similar to the voter model except that leftists and rightists are too incompatible to interact. Thinking of leftist as − state, centrist as 0 state, and rightist as + state, the constrained voter model is formally the Markov process whose state at time t is a function η t that maps the vertex set of the graph into the opinion set {−1, 0, +1}, and whose dynamics are described by the Markov generator Ω cv defined on the set of cylinder functions by
where η x,ǫ is the configuration defined by
In order to understand these opinion and cultural dynamics, we study analytically the number and mean size of the cultural domains at equilibrium. The number N t of cultural domains at time t is the number of connected components of the graph obtained by removing all the edges that connect two vertices that do not share the same culture at time t, while the mean size S t is defined as the mean number of vertices per connected component. Note that when the dynamics take place on a finite connected graph, the mean size of the cultural domains is also equal to the total number of vertices divided by the number of cultural domains. The constrained voter model and Axelrod model have been extensively studied the past ten years by social scientists as well as statistical physicists based on numerical simulations and simple mean field treatments, while there is a total lack of analytical results for the spatial models. We refer the reader to Sections III.B and IV.A of Castellano et al [2] for a review, and references therein for more details about numerical results. Spatial simulations are usually difficult to interpret, hence the need for rigorous analytical results. This article is intended to provide analytical proofs of important conjectures suggested by spatial simulations, which also gives insight into the mechanisms that promote convergence to either a monocultural equilibrium or on the contrary a highly fragmented configuration where cultural domains are uniformly bounded.
Convergence to a monocultural equilibrium -Letting θ denote the initial density of centrists in the one-dimensional constrained voter model, the mean-field analysis in [8] suggests that the average domain length at equilibrium is
when the length L of the system is large. Vázquez et al [8] also showed that these predictions agree with numerical simulations when the initial density of centrists is small enough, as indicated by their Figure 5 , from which they conclude that, for small θ, the system ends up with high probability to a frozen mixture of leftists and rightists. Their simulations, however, also suggest that a typical final frozen state is characterized by two spatial scales, with few cultural domains covering macroscopically large fractions of the universe and a number of small domains. The presence of two spatial scales also holds for the two-feature two-state Axelrod model. Even though it was not the conclusion of Vázquez et al [8] , this somewhat suggests convergence to a monocultural equilibrium in the sense of the growth of a dominant cultural domain spanning a large fraction of the whole system as defined by Castellano et al [3] . Our first result shows that both the constrained voter model and the two-feature two-state Axelrod model on the one-dimensional infinite lattice indeed converge to a monocultural equilibrium in terms of a clustering similar to that of the onedimensional voter model. This clustering indicates that the only stationary distributions are the ones supported on the set of configurations in which all vertices share the same culture.
Theorem 1
The one-dimensional two-feature two-state Axelrod model and the one-dimensional constrained voter model cluster.
The apparent contradiction between our analytical result and the numerical results in [8] is due to the fact that, when taking place on a finite connected graph, the dynamics of the Axelrod model and constrained voter model may drive the system to a culturally fragmented frozen configuration even though they promote convergence to a monocultural equilibrium, which again reveals the difficulty to interpret spatial simulations and the need for analytical results.
Fixation to a fragmented configuration -For the one-dimensional Axelrod model with an arbitrary number of features and states per feature, Vilone et al [10] have predicted through the analysis of mean-field approximation supported by numerical results that convergence to a monocultural equilibrium occurs when F > q whereas fixation to a highly fragmented configuration occurs when F < q. Here the distinction between monocultural and fragmented states is in the size of the largest cultural domain being equal to a positive fraction of the system or being bounded uniformly in the length of the system, respectively. Our second result establishes partly the latter in the sense that the expected number of cultural domains at equilibrium on a path-like graph scales like the length of the graph for an infinite subset of the parameter region F < q. Theorem 2 Assume that G = {0, 1, . . . , N } and F < q. Then
Note that the lower bound for the expected number of cultural domains also gives an upper bound for the expected length of the cultural domains since the expected number of domains times the expected length is equal to the cardinal of the vertex set. Table 1 gives the value of this theoretical upper bound for different values of F and q. Note also that Theorem 2 does not fully prove the conjecture based on the mean-field analysis of Vilone et al [10] since the lower bound in the theorem might be negative for some F < q as indicated in the table.
The intuition behind Theorems 1 and 2 that appears in our proofs can be interpreted in terms of active versus frozen boundaries between adjacent cultural domains. Here, we call an active boundary the boundary between two cultural domains with at least one feature in common. Even though the infinite system keeps evolving indefinitely, Theorem 2 indicates that for reasonably large values of the number of states q the incompatibility between adjacent vertices prevents a positive fraction of boundaries to ever become active, i.e., a positive fraction of the boundaries frozen initially stay frozen at any time. In contrast, the result of Theorem 1 is symptomatic of a large activity of the system in the sense that each vertex changes its culture infinitely often which results in the destruction of the frozen boundaries thus in the presence of cultural domains that keep growing indefinitely. Cultural dynamics including two features and two states per feature taking place on finite graphs operate similarly by promoting convergence to a monocultural equilibrium. However, due to the finiteness of the network of interactions, the system may fixate before reaching a total consensus in which case the final frozen configuration is characterized by two spatial scales: cultural domains whose length scales like the size of the system and domains which are uniformly bounded, as observed in Vázquez et al [8] . The rest of the article is devoted to the proofs.
Proof of Theorem 1
Note first that the constrained voter model is obtained from the two-feature two-state Axelrod model by identifying two cultures without common feature with the centrist opinion, and each of the other two cultures with the leftist and rightist opinions, respectively. Therefore the mean cluster size is stochastically larger for the constrained voter model than the Axelrod model, so it suffices to prove the result for the latter. To study the probability of a consensus when F = q = 2 but also the expected number of cultural domains at equilibrium when F < q in the next section, the idea is to analyze the evolution of the agreements along the edges rather than the actual opinion at each vertex. The network can be viewed as a weighted graph where each edge is assigned a weight that counts the number of features its endpoints have in common. We call e = {x, x + 1} ∈ E an edge with weight j at time t, or simply a j-edge at time t, whenever
The key to proving Theorem 1 is to observe that, when F = 2, clustering of the Axelrod model is equivalent to almost sure extinction of the 1-edges and the 0-edges. The former follows from the clustering of a certain voter model coupled with the Axelrod model, while the latter follows from the combination of clustering and a certain recurrence property of the voter model. Before going into the details of the proof, we start by collecting important results about the connection between the Axelrod model, the voter model and coalescing random walks. The first ingredient is to observe, as pointed out by Vázquez and Redner [9] , that one recovers the voter model from the two-feature two-state Axelrod model by identifying cultures that have no feature in common. Indeed, when F = q = 2, we have
Therefore, letting Y (x) = |X 1 (x) − X 2 (x)| for all x ∈ Z and noticing that
we obtain that Y · is the Markov process with generator
where Y y→x is the configuration defined by
This indicates that the process Y · is a time-change of the voter model run at rate 1/2, but since we are only interested in the limiting distribution of the Axelrod model, we shall for simplicity speed up time by a factor two in order to get the usual voter model run at rate 1. The voter model can be constructed graphically using an idea of Harris [6] , which also allows to exhibit a duality relationship between the voter model and coalescing random walks. This construction is now standard so we only give a brief description. To each vertex x ∈ Z, we attach a Poisson process with parameter one. Then, at the arrival times of this process, we choose one of the two neighbors x ± 1 uniformly at random, then draw an arrow from vertex x ± 1 to vertex x and put a δ at x to indicate that x updates its opinion by mimicking x ± 1. The connection between the voter model and coalescing random walks appears when keeping track of the ancestry of each vertex going backwards in time which also defines the so-called dual process. We say that there is a dual path from (x, T ) to (y, T − s) if there are sequences of times and vertices
such that the following two conditions hold: Then, for A ⊂ Z finite, the dual process starting at (A, T ) is the set-valued process
there is a dual path from (x, T ) to (z, T − s) for some x ∈ A}.
The dual process is naturally defined only for dual times 0 ≤ s ≤ T . However, it is convenient to assume that the Poisson processes in the graphical representation are also defined for negative times so that the dual process can be defined for all s ≥ 0. The reason for introducing the dual process is that it allows one to deduce the state of the process at the current time from the configuration at earlier times based on the duality relationship
Moreover, it can be seen from the graphical representation that the dual process evolves according to a system of simple symmetric coalescing random walks that jump at rate 1, so questions about the voter model can be answered by looking at this system of coalescing random walks. The first step, as previously mentioned, is to establish extinction of the 1-edges, which is closely related to the clustering of the one-dimensional voter model.
Lemma 3
There is extinction of the 1-edges.
Proof. Clifford and Sudbury [4] and Holley and Liggett [7] proved independently that the ddimensional voter model clusters if and only if d ≤ 2. Therefore, for all e = {x, x + 1} ∈ E,
which establishes extinction of the 1-edges.
To second step is to prove that there is extinction of the 0-edges, which follows from the combination of clustering and a certain recurrence property of the one-dimensional voter model. Here, by recurrence of the voter model, we mean that
for some t > s) = 1 for all x ∈ Z and s > 0.
Note that this notion of recurrence should not be confused with the notion of recurrence of a connected graph. Indeed, whereas Polya's theorem indicates that the d-dimensional regular lattice is recurrent if and only if d ≤ 2, the law of large number for the occupation time of the voter model established in Cox and Griffeath [5] implies that the voter model is recurrent in d > 1.
Recurrence of the one-dimensional voter model and extinction of the 0-edges rely on a series of technical lemmas. First of all, to avoid cumbersome notations, we shall only prove that the opinion of vertex 0 switches infinitely often and invoke translation invariance of the evolution rules to deduce that the voter model is recurrent. Let T 0 = T > 0, and define
as well as the spatial and space-time regions (see Figure 2 )
Then, we let W k s = W s (0, T k ) denote the dual random walk starting at (0, T k ). Recurrence of the voter model will follow from the duality relationship by proving that there is almost surely an infinite subsequence of random walks starting at vertex 0 that do not coalesce by time 0.
Lemma 4 There exist C 1 < ∞ and γ 1 > 0 such that
Proof. First, we observe that the probability to be estimated is bounded from above by the probability that the random walk performs at least 2T k jumps in T k units of time. Since jumps occur at the times of a Poisson process with parameter one, letting Z ∼ Poisson (T k ), we get
from standard large deviation estimates for the Poisson random variable.
Lemma 5 There exists C 2 < ∞ such that for all T large
Proof. The main ingredient is the well-known random walk estimate
for suitable c 1 , c 2 > 0, from which we deduce that
for all T large and a suitable constant C 2 < ∞. Figure 2 . Picture of the space-time region RT k \ RT k−1 .
Lemma 6 There exists C 3 < ∞ such that for all T large
Proof. Since all the paths connecting a vertex in Γ k−1 to a vertex outside 2 Γ k−1 have uniformly at least 2T k−1 edges, the arguments of Lemma 4 imply that
Combining the previous inequality with Lemmas 4 and 5 gives
provided T is sufficiently large.
Lemma 7
The one-dimensional voter model is recurrent, i.e.,
Proof. Let Z k = Y T k (0) denote the color of vertex 0 at time T k and introduce the events
Observing that for different values of k the space-time regions R T k \ R T k−1 are disjoint, invoking the duality relationship between the voter model and coalescing random walks, and using the fact that the vertices' colors are initially independent, we have
for all sequence k 1 < k 2 < · · · < k j of positive integers. Furthermore, it follows from Lemma 6 and the Borel Cantelli-Lemma that
The inclusion above thus gives
In particular, there is an infinite subset Λ ⊂ N such that {Z k : k ∈ Λ} forms a collection of independent Bernoulli random variables, from which it follows that the color of vertex 0 switches from black to white infinitely often with probability one. By translation invariance, the same holds for all the vertices, which completes the proof.
Lemma 8
There is extinction of the 0-edges.
Proof. Let 0 < s < t < ∞, and partition the set of 0-edges at time t into the subset Ω − of those edges that have been lately updated by time s and the subset Ω + of those edges that have been lately updated after time s, namely Ω − = {e ∈ E :X u (e) = 0 for all u ∈ (s, t)} Ω + = {e ∈ E :X t (e) = 0 andX u (e) = 1 for some u ∈ (s, t)}.
First of all, we observe that if an update occurs at vertex x when exactly one edge incident to x has weight 1 then this edge becomes a 2-edge and the other edge incident to x becomes a 1-edge, while when both edges incident to x have weight 1 then one of them becomes a 2-edge and the other one either a 0-or a 2-edge. Note also that the culture at vertex x cannot be updated as long as none of the edges incident to x has weight 1. Roughly speaking, thinking of the middle point of an edge of type j = 0, 1, as being occupied by a type j particle, we obtain an interacting particle system in which particles of type 1 evolve according to a system of annihilating random walks and the collision of two type 1 particles may or may not result in a type 0 particle. In addition, when a type 1 jumps onto a type 0, type 0 is killed. This implies that
where the set B k is the Euclidean ball with center 0 and radius k, and e ∈ B k means that both endpoints of the edge e belong to B k . Let ǫ > 0. Then, the previous inequality together with the ergodic theorem and Lemma 3 implies that there exists s large such that 2 × P (e ∈ Ω + ) ≤ P (X s (e) = 1) ≤ ǫ for all e ∈ E.
Time s being fixed, Lemma 7 implies the existence of t > s such that
In conclusion, for any ǫ > 0, there exists t > 0 large such that P (X t (e) = 0) = P (e ∈ Ω + ) + P (e ∈ Ω − ) ≤ ǫ, which establishes extinction of the 0-edges.
Having established that both sets of 0-edges and 1-edges go extinct, the proof of Theorem 1 is now straightforward, and follows the lines of Lemma 3. While the latter shows that clustering of the voter model implies extinction of the 1-edges, the last step is to prove that, conversely, extinction of type 0 and type 1 edges implies clustering of the Axelrod model. Fix x < y and let
Denote by e i = {z i , z i+1 } the edge connecting vertex z i and vertex z i+1 . Then, extinction of the 1-edges and 0-edges given respectively by Lemma 3 and Lemma 8 implies that
P (e i is a 0-edge or a 1-edge at time t) = 0.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2 which again relies on the analysis the agreements along the edges rather than the actual opinion at each vertex. Note however that the edge weight now ranges from zero to F . Moreover, since we now assume that the network of interactions is finite, the process reaches almost surely an absorbing state, that is any configuration in which each edge has either weight zero or weight F . Looking at the cultural dynamics on a path-like graph, the ultimate number of cultural domains is nearly equal to the ultimate number of edges with weight zero, so the strategy is to bound from below the number of such edges. This will be done by ultimately ignoring the spatial structure of the graph and exhibiting a connection with a simple urn problem. For all non-oriented edge e = {x, y} ∈ E and all time t, we let
t (y)} and w j (t) = card {e ∈ E :X t (e) = j} denote respectively the number of features x and y share at time t, and the number of j-edges, that is the number of edges whose endpoints have exactly j common features. The next lemma gives the connected between the ultimate number of cultural domains and the ultimate number of 0-edges, which holds on a path and more generally a finite tree.
Lemma 9 lim t→∞ N t = lim t→∞ w 0 (t) + 1.
Proof. The number N t of cultural domains at time t is the number of connected components of the graph obtained by removing all edges whose weight at time t differs from F . In the case of a finite tree, this results in a forest whose number of connected components is equal to the number of edges removed plus one, from which it follows that N t = w 0 (t) + w 1 (t) + · · · + w n−1 (t) + 1.
Since the Axelrod model on a finite graph converges to one of its absorbing states and that each absorbing state is characterized by all the edges having weight either 0 or F , we also have lim t→∞ w j (t) = 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , F − 1.
The result follows.
Motivated by the previous lemma, the next step is to estimate the number of 0-edges when the process reaches one of its absorbing states. First, we look at the initial distribution of edges with a given weight, which is done in the next lemma. Then, we rely on duality type techniques to prove that there is enough independence among vertices to slow down the destruction of 0-edges.
Proof. Let e = {x, y} ∈ E. Using that all the (N + 1)F initial cultural features are independent uniform random variables taking q different values, we obtain
Since the graph has no loop, it follows that the initial number of j-edges, w j (0), is a sum of independent Bernoulli random variables with parameter p j . Observing that path-like graphs, and more generally trees, with N + 1 vertices have N edges completes the proof.
Lemma 11 Let 0 ≤ x < y < z ≤ N and fix i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , F }. Then
where the event
Proof. The idea is to keep track of the ancestors of each feature going backwards in time, although duality here is not mathematically tractable. First, we construct the process graphically from collections of independent random variables: for each oriented edge e = (u, v) and n ≥ 1, 1. T n (e) is the nth arrival time of a Poisson process with rate 1/2, 2. U n (e) is the discrete random variable uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , F }, 3. W n (e) is the continuous random variable uniformly distributed over (0, 1).
The process starting from any initial configuration is constructed inductively as follows. Assume that the process has been constructed up to time s− where s = T n (e). Let
Then, we have the following alternative.
1. If U n (e) ∈ I s− (e) and J s− (e) = ∅ then we draw an arrow from u to v at time s.
2. If U n (e) ∈ J s− (e) or J s− (e) = ∅ then we do nothing.
Thinking of an arrow oriented from u to v as representing an interaction that causes vertex v to mimic one of the features of u, this indicates that adjacent vertices with different cultures interact at a rate equal to the fraction of features they share. On the event that 1 above occurs, we let J s− (e) = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k } and j = min {l ∈ N * : k · W n (e) < l}, label the arrow with the number J = i j and set the Jth feature of v at time s equal to the Jth feature of u at time s−. This defines the Axelrod model. Now, given an initial configuration in which features are independent and uniformly distributed, and independent collections of random variables, we draw the arrows along with their label up to time t following the rule previously described. Then, we say that there is an i-lineage from (u, t) to (w, t − s) if there are
such that the following two conditions hold:
1. For j = 1, 2, . . . , n, there is an i-arrow from u j−1 to u j at time s j and 2. For j = 0, 1, . . . , n, the segment {u j } × (s j , s j+1 ) does not contain any tips of i-arrow.
Note that for all s ∈ (0, t), there is a unique vertex w such that 1-2 hold. We define the backwards process that keeps track of the unique i-lineage starting at (u, t) by lettinĝ
there is an i-lineage from (u, t) to (w, t − s)}, and refer the reader to Figure 3 for an illustration. The connection between the process and the system of i-lineages is similar to the duality relationship between the voter model and coalescing random walks. Roughly speaking, letting u i denote the position at time 0 of the i-lineage starting at point (u, t), we have that the ith cultural feature of vertex u at time t is equal to the initial ith cultural feature of vertex u i . In addition, since i-lineages starting at different space-time points are constructed from the same set of i-arrows, they coalesce whenever they intersect. Note however that lineages do not evolve backwards in time according to simple symmetric random walks. To deduce the lemma, we first observe that
In addition, since i-lineages cannot cross each other without coalescing, we also havê
from which we deduce that x i < y i < z i . That is, the ith feature of vertex x and the ith feature of vertex z are determined by the initial ith features of two different vertices, thus
and are independent. The lemma follows. Lemma 11 allows to gain insight into the evolution of a key variable that she shall call the total number of agreements in the system and that we formally defined by
The dynamics of the Axelrod model imply that at each update of the system the weight of one edge is increased by one while, if the updated vertex has degree two, the weight of the second edge connected to this vertex may either stay unchanged, increase or decrease, i.e., the total number of agreements W (t) increases at each update by 0, 1, or 2. The next result looks at W (t) to show that the emergence of additional agreements is rather slow when q is large.
Lemma 12 Assume that the state of the process is updated at time t. Then
Proof. Let x denote the vertex whose culture is updated at time t, and observe that, since only one weight is updated when x has degree one, P (W (t) − W (t−) = 2 and x = 0) = P (W (t) − W (t−) = 2 and x = N ) = 0.
To deal with the nontrivial case when x has degree two, we may assume without loss of generality that vertex x mimics one of the cultural features of vertex x − 1, and introduce
the set of features for which vertices x and x − 1 disagree, and the event that vertex x mimics the ith feature of vertex x − 1, respectively. Then, for all i ∈ I, we have
This, together with Lemma 11 and the fact that {Θ i : i ∈ I} is a partition, gives P (W (t) − W (t−) = 2 and 0 < x < N ) ≤ i∈I P (W (t) − W (t−) = 2 and 0 < x < N and Θ i )
This completes the proof.
To estimate the ultimate number of 0-edges, we now introduce a simple urn problem coupled with the opinion dynamics: consider a set of F + 1 boxes, labeled from box 0 to box F , containing a certain random number of balls. Let B j (t) denote the number of balls in box j at time t, which has to be thought of as keeping track of the number of j-edges in the system. The total number of balls is constant, equal to the number N of edges, and given an initial configuration of cultures and a realization of the cultural dynamics, the game starts with
and each time the Axelrod model is updated, say at time t, the configuration of boxes evolves according to the following rules:
2. If W (t) − W (t−) = 2, we move a ball from box j to box j + 1 where box j (if it exists) is chosen uniformly from the set of non empty boxes different from 0 and F . In case a ball has indeed been moved, we move another ball from box 0 to box 1 if it exists.
The game halts when the Axelrod model hits an absorbing state, or equivalently when all the edges have either weight 0 or weight F . Then, at any time, the number of balls in box 0 is smaller than the number of 0-edges in the system, as stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 13 For all t ≥ 0, we have B 0 (t) ≤ w 0 (t).
Proof. The idea is to prove by induction that, as long as box 0 is non empty (note that once it is empty the result is trivial), we have for all time t B 0 (t) ≤ w 0 (t) and β(t) :=
Note that β(t) can be seen as the number of steps required after t to move all the balls to box F , excluding the ones which are in box 0 at time t. The two inequalities to be proved are obviously true at time 0 since initially there are as many balls in box j as there are j-edges. Assume that they are true at time t− and that a culture is updated at time t. Since
and a weight jumps from 0 to 1 at time t only if W (t) − W (t−) = 2, we have:
2. Assume that W (t) − W (t−) = 1. Then
3. Assume that W (t) − W (t−) = 2. Since β(t−) ≥ ǫ(t−) ≥ 1, one of the inner boxes is non empty, which implies that a ball is moved from box 0 to box 1. It follows that
Lemma 14 Assume that F < q. Then
Proof. For more convenience, we assume that the game evolves in discrete time, change slightly the evolution rules, and divide the game into rounds as follows:
Round 1 -We paint in black all the balls in box 0 and in white all the other balls and, at each step, move a white ball from box j to box j + 1 where box j (if it exists) is chosen uniformly from the set of boxes containing at least one white ball, excluding box F . In case a ball has indeed been moved, we move another ball from box 0 to box 1 with probability (q − 1) −1 . This halts when all the white balls are in box F .
Round 2 -Note that, at the end of round 1, all the boxes are empty but boxes 0 and 1 that contain only black balls, and box F that contains only white balls. We paint in white all the balls in box 1 after which the game evolves as described in round 1.
Round 3 is defined starting from the final configuration of round 2 in the same way as round 2 is defined starting from the final configuration of round 1, and so on (we refer to the right-hand side of Figure 3 for a schematic illustration of a single step evolution). The game halts when all balls are either in box 0 or box F . Letting B j (t) denote the number of balls in box j at step t for this new game, it follows from Lemma 12 that ultimately lim t→∞ E (B 0 (t)) ≤ lim t→∞ E (B 0 (t)) whenever B j (0) = B j (0) for all j therefore it suffices to bound from below the limit on the left-hand side. Let T k denote the time at which round k halts. Since F − j steps are required to move a white ball from box j to box F , and all the white balls at the beginning of each round k ≥ 2 are either in box 1 or box F ,
(F − j) B j (0) and
The expression of T 1 together with Lemma 10 implies that
The expression of T k+1 − T k together with the fact that at each time step a black ball is moved from box 0 to box 1 with probability (q − 1) −1 implies that
from which it follows that
Observing that B 1 (T 1 ) ∼ Binomial (T 1 , (q − 1) −1 ), we obtain
Using again Lemma 10, we deduce that
Finally, applying respectively Lemmas 9, 13 and 14, we obtain
which proves Theorem 2.
